The advent of the sixth Android version brought a significant security and privacy advancement to its users. The platform's security model has changed dramatically, allowing users to grant or deny access to resources when requested by applications during run-time. This improvement changed the traditional coarse-grained permission system and it was anticipated for a long time by privacy-aware users. In this paper, we present a pilot study that aims to analyze how Android users adapted to the run-time permission model. We gathered anonymous data from 52 participants, who downloaded an application we developed and answered questions related to the run-time permission model. Their answers suggest that most of them positively accepted the new model. We also collected data that describe users' permission settings for each installed application on their devices. Our analysis shows that individuals make consistent choices regarding the resources they allow to various applications to access. In addition, the results of this pilot study showcase that on a second data collection round (occurred one month after the first phase of our experiments), 50% of the respondents did not change a single permission on their devices and only 2.26% of installed applications (on average) presented altered permission settings.
Introduction
When Android Developers released the Developers Preview of the Marshmallow version (v6.0) during summer 2015, a major change at the permission system was introduced; the sixth version ini-5 tiated the run-time permission model. The previous versions are listing at instalation time the resources that the application to be installed is going to utilize. After reviewing the requested permissions (which were presented as groups, e.g. Con-10 tacts) the user can choose to accept or deny the installation. This binary model (accept-reject) has been criticized at the past as being ineffective to provide meaningful information about the way the application to be installed will affect user's pri-15 vacy [1, 2] . In addition, it limits users' ability to * Corresponding author Email address: panagiotis.andriotis@uwe.ac.uk (Panagiotis Andriotis) URL: www.andrio.eu (Panagiotis Andriotis) manage the applications' accessibility to their private data. Therefore, the transition from this model to a new one, that would allow users to control the resources that applications were allowed to use (fol-20 lowing the iOS paradigm) was anticipated for a long time.
The run-time permission model (aka ask-on-firstuse (AOFU) [3] ) is based on the principle of least privilege and assumes that applications will be able 25 to function at a basic level, even if the users do not provide access to resources that might affect their privacy. Therefore, applications designed to adhere to this model must request access to sensitive resources during run-time. These actions will 30 (in theory) keep users informed about what an application is trying to do in the background and will provide limited contextual information [4] .
According to the official documentation for Android Developers 1 , there are two basic categories of permissions; normal and dangerous. The documentation notes that the system automatically grants access to resources that applications requested via normal permissions, because access to these resources is considered to be of low risk. On the other hand, if an application needs to access users' private information, or other sensitive data stored on the device, then the associated permissions with these actions are considered as dangerous. Hence, applications designed to function properly under garding the acceptance of these permissions) can be unrealistically high [7] , urged researchers lately to propose automated permission recommendation schemes. Some systems use crowdsourcing methods [8] and others employ machine learning mod-70 els that incorporate contextual information aiming to predict users' privacy decisions [3] . In order to achieve that, Wijesekera et al. [3] used modified versions of the Android operating system to acquire application usage data and the Experience
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Sampling Method (ESM) [9] to collect ground truth data about users' privacy preferences. Additionally, Liu et al. [7] deployed rooted devices which were modified and enhanced with the Android permission manager "Apps Ops" [2, 10] . Hence, prior work 80 was based on experiments conducted with modified devices, specifically instrumented to gather privacy related data.
Knowing that under the coarse-grained permission model, users are not allowed to intervene with 85 the access control system (since applications can access all resources on a mobile device after the installation process), we investigate in this paper how Android users adjusted their privacy preferences under the fine-grained run-time permission 90 model (AOFU). We consider the following questions in this pilot study. a) Which are the sensitive resources Android users allow more often to be accessed on their phones? b) Are they strict or selective when applications request access to specific 95 sensitive data? c) Do they make consistent choices when they grant or deny access to these resources? d) Are these choices time persistent?
To this end, this paper 2 presents the results of a pilot study that assesses users' adaptation to the 100 Android run-time permission model. For the needs of this study we developed and distributed an application at the official Android marketplace (Google Play) aiming to collect anonymous data related to the permissions that were granted (or denied) by 105 users at that time ('Permissions snapshot'). We did not monitor users' actions for a long time because we assumed that this choice would discourage many people to voluntarily download the app and participate to the study. This is a different approach from 110 prior work [3, 4, 7] as we aim to gather permission information from devices that were actually used by participants in their daily lives and were not running a modified version of the operating system. Our data collection method is not intrusive 115 or pervasive and does not introduce biases related with asking security and privacy questions (privacy nudges). Thus, we chose to obtain snapshots of the permission settings from the participants' devices. Our application collected permission data twice (in 120 an one-month period) and only when the users were informed and agreed to provide them, according to the ethics approval agreement. The aim of our pilot study is to examine users' perceptions of the provided security and privacy, and at the same time, 125 to investigate how Android users adapted to the AOFU permission model. This work studies and presents security and privacy preferences of Android users of the fine-grained permission model. The contributions of this paper are the following:
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• We collected data derived from devices that were running the Android Marshmallow operating system, hence the permission data came from a sample of 52 participants who were ac-tually using these devices for a considerable pe-riod of time 3 .
• We present comparative views of users' permissions settings and other privacy preferences associated to the use of popular social media. Moreover, we showcase which sensitive re-sources were used from our participants more frequently.
• We demonstrate that our participants presented a consistent behavior regarding the resources they allow to be accessed by social me-145 dia and communication applications. Furthermore, this pilot study shows that the granted permissions to installed applications from the same participants after a period of one month were not dramatically altered. This result ver-
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ifies similar findings presented recently [7] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the methodology we used to derive data and reconstruct permission settings for each participant. Section 3 presents the acquired 155 results focusing at the beginning on the survey answers; then it analyzes our findings from the collected permission data. In section 4 we discuss limitations of our study, proposing at the same time directions for future work. We review related work 160 in section 5 and conclude this paper in section 6.
Methodology
This section presents the methodology we used to collect and analyze data. Data collection was carried out in two phases using an application we de-165 veloped, which was distributed via the official Android marketplace (Google Play) following the example of other recent research works [12] . The application, named "Permissions Snapshot", initially served as a survey instrument, but it also collected 170 anonymous permission data from the devices that were using it. The participants needed to download the application on their devices, answer six multiple choice questions about their experience with the run-time permission model and then send permis-175 sion data to our server. At the second phase (after a period of one month) the same participants were asked to send permission data again, as explained 3 The anonymized dataset can be found online at the following address: http://dx.doi.org/10.14324/000.ds. 1520825 in more details in the following section. Before we distribute the application on Google Play and pub-180 licize it, we obtained approval to proceed with this project from the UCL Ethics Committee (Project ID Number: 8945/001).
Survey and Questionnaire Design
The application we developed targeted Android
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Marshmallow users (SDK 23+) and could not be installed on devices that run an older version of the operating system (OS). This means that the collected data came from participants who were already familiar with the sixth Android version 190 (Marshmallow). During the data collection period (June -August 2016), the most modern version of the OS was the sixth; however, the seventh version ('Nougat') was released as a "Developers Preview" version.
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Our application did not collect personal information apart from the package names of the installed applications on the device and the requested permissions. The participants were informed about this action after reading the 'Information Sheet ', 200 which was provided at the 'Description' section of the installation page on Google Play. The 'Information Sheet' was also shown when the application was launched by the user. "Permissions snapshot" did not collect application usage data because that 205 would entail additional effort from users to turn on the usage statistics feature on their phones. This action cannot occur automatically or programmatically on modern Android versions. We chose to refrain from engaging users in this action, having 210 in mind that the participants (volunteers) could be discouraged by any additional complexity, or even worse, become sceptical about their involvement with the study and, therefore, quit before answering any questions.
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In order to avoid duplicate entries from participants (and devices), "Permission Snapshots" requested from the system (during run-time) to get the ANDROID ID of the device 4 . This number was used by our application to compute and return a 220 hashed value that could be used from us to maintain users' anonymity and, at the same time, identify possible duplicate entries during analysis. Before releasing the data to the public, we replaced these hexadecimal strings with random numbers to 225 further anonymize them. 4 The ANDROID ID is a hexadecimal number granted by the system, which uniquely distinguishes devices. Next, we discuss how participants were interacting with our application. At the first phase, when users launched the application, they had to read the 'Information Sheet' which described the aim of 230 the study and the steps that would follow. Participants had to tap on a check box to indicate they gave their consent to share anonymous data and participate to the study. The users were always informed about the current and the next step of the 235 process via short texts provided by the application (see figure 1a) . After users agreed to provide their consent to share anonymous data, the application received detailed information about the permissions that the system granted (or not) for each installed 240 application at that specific time. In order to achieve that, our application utilized the PackageManager class and received data via its getPackageInfo public method. This was an instant procedure on contemporary devices.
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After permission data were stored locally on the device, the user was able to participate to the survey. Initially we gathered basic demographic data, as figure 1b demonstrates. Then the participants had to answer six multiple choice questions (by 250 clicking on radio buttons). Each question was presented on a single activity and the user had to click the 'Next' button to proceed with the next question. It should be noted that all questions had predefined answers in order to make analysis easier 255 for us and distinguish participants who were just skipping questions by clicking the 'Next' button. When the six questions were answered, the participants sent the responses (along with the demographic and the permissions data) to our server by 260 clicking a button. Respondents were able to withdraw and uninstall the app any time, before they send their data to the server. At the final step of the first phase, the application showed to the participant a short tutorial that discussed the changes 265 at the permission model (figure 1c). Our application's users were told that they could uninstall it at that phase. However, we suggested them to keep the application on their devices, because they would have the chance to participate to the survey again 270 in the near future.
The questionnaire should be short and simple, because according to [13] , these types of questionnaires usually attract higher response rates than long and complex ones. Also, we needed the com-275 pletion of the survey to be an effortless and pleasant process, given that our participants would volunteer to provide responses. We chose closed format questions because they are easy to fill in. Moreover, it would be easier for users to click on radio buttons 280 instead of typing answers to open questions on their phones. The questions had predefined answers to assist us clean up the data from responses coming from users that where just clicking the "Next" button without reading the questions. However, we 285 did not include verifier questions because the questionnaire was short and we did not want to confuse or disorient the user by asking again the same question. We ensured that questions were easily readable on the majority of devices using facilities 290 provided by the Android Studio (an integrated development environment for Android developers).
When designing the questionnaire, we followed the conventional wisdom which contains advice about how to optimize question order [14] . We or-295 dered the questions according to the following logic: Early questions should be easy and pleasant to answer [15] , and questions on the same topic should proceed from general to specific [14, 16] . Hence, participants were first asked how long they were us-300 ing the current OS version and then if they had noticed the permission model change. Then we asked the respondents if they believed that the aforementioned change affected positively their ability to manage shared data. With the following two 305 questions (number 4 and 5) we intended to see the users' familiarity with the new model and if popup messages, appearing during run-time, were causing fatigue [17] . Finally, with the last question we intended to validate that users prefer fine-grained 310 permission models as proposed in [18] . The questions are as follows: For the second phase of data collection, the application generated a notification message after a 360 period of one month. Participants who did not uninstall the application after the completion of the first phase, received a notification on their devices (and wearables) to participate again to the survey (as seen at figure 1d). Hence, there was a chance 365 for participants to upload permission data again, following the same procedure they used at the first phase of data collection, i.e. by clicking a button. Therefore, we could use the second set of data to compare them with the first set. After the second 370 set of data was delivered to our server, the users were gracefully adviced to uninstall the application. Interestingly, taking into account data provided by the Google Play Console 5 (and considering also a few pilot trials we ran on various devices prior the 375 release of our application), 15 devices (out of 61 that downloaded our application) appeared to have our application installed four months after we released it for the first time to the Google Play store. This means that approximately 24.6% of the users 380 did not uninstall the application, despite the fact that they were prompted to do so.
Permission Data Acquisition
This section presents our methodology to acquire permission data from devices. Our intention was to Note that "Permissions Snapshots" did not gather information about system's applications. After experimenting 405 with these settings during a pilot study conducted prior to the official release of the application, we concluded that for each requested permission, the system returns public arrays of Strings and ints denoting the current permission settings on 410 the device. In our log files we denoted a granted permission with 3 and a denied permission with 1.
According to the Android Developers' documentation 6 , the first time an application requests to access sensitive resources (such as the SMS list on the 415 device, using for example the permission READ SMS), it displays to the users a dialogue message in order to get explicitly their permission to do so. However, if users allowed at the past access to a sensitive group (e.g. accepted READ SMS from the SMS 420 group), then when the application requests a different permission from this group (e.g. SEND SMS), the system will immediately grant it.
For our analysis we considered these characteristics to reconstruct the permission settings for 425 each application (and each permission group). For example, if for the package org.telegram.messenger (the 'Telegram' application) the PackageManager returned "android.permission.READ CONTACTS, 1" and 430 "android.permission.WRITE CONTACTS, 3", this means that the application was granted permission to access the 'Contacts' group. Thus, after a user had chosen to see the permission settings of this application from the Settings app on the device, 435 she would see that the Contacts switch would be turned to the 'On' position (as figure 1e shows).
We treat different versions of the same application uniformly, because we did not expect to see massive changes among various versions, given that data 440 collection was done in a short period of time.
Results
The study was publicized at university mailing lists, social media and forums for a short period of time (June -August 2016). We stopped collect-445 ing data after the end of August 2016 and we finally received responses from 52 participants. It should be noted that no compensation or prizes were offered at this campaign. Our respondents contributed to this study as volunteers. In addi-450 tion, during the specific period, the Android Developers Dashboards 7 reported that only 10% of the Android users that visited Google Play had installed the Marshmallow version on their devices. Therefore, finding volunteers for this study was ex-455 tremely difficult at the given period. Having that in mind we followed a lightweight approach in data collection and decided to apply the snapshots model instead of constantly monitoring users' devices. We believe that this approach would not discourage 460 participants to provide anonymous data. In addition, we expected that our study would probably attract more tech-savvy users, given that new Android versions' adoption is usually slow and Nexus phone users are getting software updates faster than 465 others.
Three users from our sample provided the predefined answers of the questionnaire, hence their demographic data and responses were excluded from the presented results. However, their device data 470 were included in the analysis, because they could not be manipulated or falsified from these users; these are device-dependent data. Also, two participants stated that they were below 18 years old; therefore, we excluded their data and their re-475 sponses from our dataset and did not take them into account in the analysis. The minimum age for an Android user to participate to our study was set to be the age of 18. Additionally, a particular file contained permission data, but no demograph-480 ics or responses. However, these permission data were included in the analysis. Finally, one file (derived from device No 24) contained only permission data of our application and the responses to the 7 http://bit.ly/1kjKifB six questions. We included these responses to the 485 demographic data too.
Demographics and Questionnaire
In total, 46 responses to the six questions were included to the analysis. 85% of the participants were male and 15% were female. More than half of the users were between 18 to 30 years of age (52%), 37% were 31 to 46 years old, 9% were between 47 and 65 years old and 2% were above 66 years old. The majority of the respondents were residents of Europe (74%); the rest were from America-Canada
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(17%) and 9% of the respondents claimed they were from Asia.
Regarding the responses at the first question, 52% of the participants had been using the Android Marshmallow version for 0 -6 months. 30% 500 of the participants had been using the OS for 7 -12 months and 11% claimed they had been using the system for more than a year. The latter response may seem inaccurate because Marshmallow was released during the last quarter of 2015. However, 505 this finding might indicate that a few respondents were mobile software developers who were using the Developer Previews of the system; these were released earlier, during summer 2015. This explanation is reasonable if we take into consideration 510 that the application was also advertized to Google+ Communities related to Android. The rest of the participants (7%) clicked the "I Don't Know" option.
Considering the second question, 89% of the par-515 ticipants replied that they had noticed the change at the permission model. 7% said they did not notice any difference and 4% chose the "I Don't Know" answer. This finding shows that the majority of the participants were familiar with the change 520 at the permission model. The consequent questions were related to the security and usability of the new permission model. At the third question, 65% of the respondents replied positively; they thought that the users could 525 effectively control the personal data they share under the run-time permission model. 17% replied negatively and 17% said "I Don't Know". The responses at question 4 demonstrated that the participants of our study were familiar with the new ca-530 pabilities the Settings app provide. 78% chose the "I Agree" response, 7% clicked on "I Disagree" and 15% said "I Don't Know". Considering the usability of the model and the security fatigue that might cause, the responses at the fifth question showed that Marshmallow users were not overwhelmed by security dialogue messages produced by the system. 89% of the participants replied "I Disagree" and only 11% clicked on the "I Agree" choice.
At the final question the participants were asked 540 if they prefer the run-time permission model or the old one. 78% of them stated they prefer the runtime permission model and 9% said they prefer the previous model. Additionally, 13% clicked the "I don't have any specific preference" option. The an-545 swers to the last question indicate that users reacted positively to the changes, confirming previous results [18] . To conclude this section, the answers of the majority of users in our sample suggest that they 550 think they can control the data they share more efficiently under the run-time permissions model. Also the participants in our study were not frustrated by the dialogue messages the system issues and, finally, they preferred the run-time permis-555 sions model, compared to the previous one.
Data Analysis
As discussed previously, we received permission data from 52 devices but we finally analyzed data derived from 49 devices. Recall that one device 560 returned permission data only from our application and 2 participants declared they were younger than 18 years old; thus, these permission data were excluded from analysis. The following information is provided to describe our dataset in details. 
Installed Applications
The average number of installed applications per device was approximately 71 and the standard deviation was 52.69. The maximum number of applica- Figure 2 shows the number of installed applications per device (first boxplot). The most popular applications among the participants of our 575 study can be seen at Table 1 .
Declared and Dangerous Permissions
Android applications contain declared permissions in the AndroidManifest.xml file. This information is available to the PackageManager dur- The aforementioned numbers indicate that (on average) 31% of the declared permissions in the AndroidManifest.xml file of each application belonged to dangerous permissions groups. The application com.baidu.appsearch declared 118 595 permissions in its manifest file and 19 of them belonged to dangerous groups.
Moreover, the application 'Signal Private Messenger' (org.thoughtcrime.securesms) declared 20 permissions that belonged to dangerous permissions 600 groups. These applications presented the highest number of declared and dangerous permissions in our dataset, respectively. Table 2 shows applications that declared the highest number of permissions and Table 3 those with the highest number 605 of dangerous permissions in our dataset. Note that some applications can be seen more than once, having different number of declared or dangerous per- 
Permission Groups
We mentioned previously (in Section 2.2) that we grouped the declared permissions to simulate the user interface of the Settings app when it shows the granted permissions per application (Figure 1e ).
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According to the Android Developers documentation 8 , there exist 9 groups of dangerous permissions at API level 23 and above (up to API 27 as of January 2018): Calendar, Camera, Contacts, Location, Microphone, Phone, Sensors, SMS, Storage. 
Dangerous Permissions Requests per Device
First, we estimated how many applications on average request access to dangerous permissions groups per device. Hence, we measured the appearance of dangerous permissions in the manifest file of 625 each application per device. In this step we did not consider if the particular groups were granted access permission by the user. We demonstrate the results at Figure 3 , which presents the average dangerous permissions requests per device (concatenated 630 as dangerous permissions groups). Figure 3 shows that the Camera, Contacts, Location, Phone and Storage groups were the most requested dangerous groups per device. In addition, Table 4 presents more generic infor-635 mation, showcasing the average use of dangerous permissions (gathered as groups) and their standard deviations in our dataset. We can see that indeed requests to access the device's storage were made by almost 77% of the applications in our 640 dataset. Other popular resources for applications were the Contact list and the Location; access to these resources were requested by the half of the applications in our dataset.
Permission Groups' Accessibility
645 Figure 4 provides a rough representation of the permission groups' accessibility. This figure demonstrates the percentage of permission groups that appeared to be accessible from the installed appli- cations per device. The methodology described at 650 Section 2.2 was used to estimate these percentages. As figure 4 shows, users tend to have a stable behavior (considering their security preferences) when dealing with different applications on the same device. For example, more than 80% of the appli- However, this indication (that users seem to have a stable behavior when granting access to resources on their devices to various applications) might be 660 skewed by the fact that there existed numerous applications per device that were probably not designed to adhere to the new permission model. Thus, during the transitional period our experiments took place, applications like 'Snapchat' ap-665 peared to have access to all dangerous resources, in order to maintain backward compatibility. Such applications can be easily identified if the user tries to revoke access to resources via the Settings app; the system will issue the following message, which 670 is rather preventive in our opinion: "This app was designed for an older version of Android. Denying permission may cause it to no longer function as intended".
Despite that figure 4 provides probably a noisy 675 representation of the accessibility to sensitive resources, it forms an early estimation that users tend to persistently grant access to specific resources and deny it to others. In the next sections we will study closely users' privacy preferences for popular appli-680 cations. 
Fine-grained Permissions on Social Media and Communication Applications
This Section presents users' security preferences, considering fine-grained permission settings for 685 popular social media applications. We focused on social media and messaging applications because they were installed by numerous participants. Other application categories (such as business or travel) are not studied here because we did not have 690 adequate data from enough users that would allow us to make safe conclusions. Table 1 showed the most popular applications in 695 the dataset. Note that most of them are social media and messaging applications. Thus, we focused our study on eight applications and instant messengers: (Facebook) Messenger (orca), Facebook (katana), Whatsapp, Twitter, Skype, Instagram,
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Linkedin and Telegram. We will refer to this set of applications as the 'social' set S. Despite Telegram was not among the most installed applications, it was added in this section because it is known for its 'end-to-end' encryption capabilities. Hence, it 705 would be interesting to see users' preferences for this application. Table 5 shows the popularity of the aforementioned applications in our sample (percentage of installations). Facebook Messenger appeared to be more popular than the Facebook ap-710 plication itself, indicating that there exists a considerable number of users that prefer to use only the Messenger application. Table 6 shows the percentage of devices on which applications from S were allowed (All On) or "de-715 nied" (All Off) access to all permission groups, or appeared to have fine-grained settings, respectively (F-Gr). We should note here that in the "denied" category we also included permissions that were cautious when dealing with permission settings.
Analysis Based on the F-Gr User Group
To avoid misleading conclusions arising from the possibility that participants might not have used a specific application from the social set S, we 735 only considered (in this and the following section) participants with fine-grained permission settings. Indeed, this assumption might exclude permission data from users who denied access to all resources when they ran the specific applications or they did 740 not ever use the app. However, we believe that the F-Gr user group will give us a better understanding on how users, who care about permissions, act. Figure 5 (a, b, c) shows graphically how our participants tuned their permission settings for the Face-745 book Messenger, WhatsApp and Uber applications respectively. Green color indicates that permission was granted to the dangerous group and red color indicates that permission was denied or revoked by the user to the dangerous group. Ochre cells in-750 dicate that permissions for the specific group were not found on the device. For example, user No 3 had probably installed an older version of the Uber application, which did not include the use of the device's microphone (figure 5c Users' preferences may be also linked with their level of trust to the specific application or they may only indicate how users interact with these applications. For example, the fact that the Camera group is in general marked red in both applications 805 might denote that the majority of our participants did not primarily use Facebook or Twitter to take pictures. Thus, the demonstrated accessibility in Figure 6 presents in a concise graph the percentage of users that granted permissions to danger-830 ous groups per application. As previously stated, we only consider participants from the F-Gr group, as seen at Table 6 . Figure 6 shows for example that all users allowed the LinkedIn application to access their Contact List (100%). However, appli- We can also extract additional common charac-845 teristics from figure 6 regarding users' preferences and permission settings. For instance, if we focus on the Storage group we can see that most of the users allow the applications (of our social set S) to access the storage of their devices. However, users' prefer-850 ences indicate that they are more reluctant to grant storage access to applications like Uber. This finding is probably linked with the functionality of each application and the reasons we use them. Another generic observation can be made for the SMS group.
A Generic Comparison for Granted Permissions per Application
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We derive that users are hesitant to allow applications to access their SMS list with the exception of WhatsApp and Telegram. A possible explanation for this result is that both applications provide endto-end encryption, providing higher levels of trust to their users. In general, these two applications present high levels of accessibility (70% and above) in almost all dangerous groups. Furthermore, one could note that WhatsApp and Telegram's Location accessibility is not high (approximately 20%).
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The gathered data are not sufficient to allow us to explain why this occurred. However, the answer to this phenomenon might be hidden in the interplay of trust and functionality. Trust in this context is not only linked with the use of encryption; trust 870 can be also derived from the developer of the app.
Users' Behavioral Consistency
In this section we study if users present a consistent behavior when they are using different applications on their devices. In other words, we ex-875 amine if the same participant follows the same behavioral patterns when using the fine-grained permission system on a variety of applications on the same device. In order to do that, we identified the users in our sample who had installed at least 3 of 880 the applications listed at Table 5 on their devices. Note that LinkedIn and Telegram applications were excluded from the analysis for this section, because the former application declares access to only 3 dangerous groups and the latter was installed only on 885 7 devices. Thus, we are particularly interested in permission-aggressive applications in this context. We will refer to this set of applications as the 'popular' set P. As the goal of this section is to highlight consistent behaviors regarding permission settings 890 preferences, we did not take into consideration the Calendar permissions group, because it is declared only on Facebook. Hence, we evaluate similarities to the way users grant or deny access to specific resources considering at least 3 popular social media 895 applications installed on the same device.
Behavioral Similarity
We define the term 'behavioral similarity' to assess common characteristics of user's behavior related to the permission settings on their devices.
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Behavioral similarity or behavioral consistency is defined here as the quality of preserving similar user behavior when various applications (at least 3) request access to a specific permission group. For example, if the user has granted (or denied) access 905 to the Microphone group to at least 60% of social media applications (installed on the same device), then this is considered in this work to indicate behavioral consistency. Figure 7 demonstrates the behavioral consistency 910 of 33 users in our sample. Here we did not exclude users from the 'All On' and 'All Off' groups, in order to provide a more generic view. The inclusion of these users will probably result in very high values of consistency in rare occasions where all considered 915 applications belong to the 'All On' group. Given that we did not store information that would reveal if installed applications were compiled to abide the new model, we included these users in the analysis. In general, users had installed at least 3 applications 920 from the popular applications set, as discussed previously. The goal of our analysis here is to evaluate if a user who denies (or grants) access to a specific dangerous group for one application, maintains the same behavior, when asked to provide access to the 925 particular dangerous group by another application. Table Showing Participants' Permission Settings Consistency for Applications from the P Set. The calculation of a user's behavioral consistency was performed as follows. Considering the number of applications (from the popular set P) found on a single device, we highlighted which of them 930 were granted or denied access to each permission group. For example, user No 5 had installed 5 applications from the popular set. Access to Camera, Contacts and Microphone was denied to 4 applications among them (80%). On the contrary, access 935 to Storage was granted to 4 applications (80%) and access to Location was granted to 3 applications (60%), as figure 7 shows. We consider as consistent behaviour either the persistent denial or the persistent permittance to a specific resource. Another ex-940 ample is User No 3, who only presented similarities at the Contacts, Location and Storage groups settings (83.3%, 66.67%, 66.67%, respectively). Again, given the lack of usage statistics, we cannot decide if a group was asked to be given access; these per-945 missions are included in the "denied" category. seem to have similar behaviors when granting access to social media applications. As future work, we aim to identify such privacy profiles.
Finally, we estimated the average values of behavioral consistency per user and the results can 960 be seen at Figure 9 . The overall average behavior consistency in our sample is 83.26% and the standard deviation is 10.05. Without a doubt, behavioural consistency seems to be high in our dataset. This probably occurs because the set P
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consists of a small number of popular applications, basically from the social media and messaging category. Thus, the elements of similarity in functionality and trustfulness are present in this set. Further work should be done in the future to examine if 970 behavioral consistency is maintained when we compare applications from different categories and if these high numbers of consistency remain the same when we are dealing with larger groups of users.
To conclude, this section presented our analysis 975 on 33 participants, which indicates that users of popular social media in our sample demonstrated consistency, allowing or denying access in a uni- 
Behavioral Consistency over Time
The second phase of experiments aimed to analyze if participants' preferences and permissions settings change after a period of time. The application we developed set an alarm to the device, 985 which would go off one month after the application was first launched. In addition, we used the Google Cloud Messaging service to further enhance communication with the devices that still had our application installed (via push notifications).
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As mentioned at Section 2.1, we indicated the changes of the permission model to the users by showing a small tutorial at the last part of the first phase. Participants were reminded that they could revoke access to sensitive resources using the Set-995 tings application. We suggested the participants to keep the application on their devices after the first phase was completed and participate again, when they see a notification on their phones (or on their Android smartwatches). The notifications were not 1000 persistent; they were designed to be erased (clicking the 'Clear All' option on the Notification drawer) if the user did not want to participate for a second time to our experiments. As already noted, our participants were volunteers and we did not want the 1005 application to be very pervasive and aggressive.
The participants sent their data during the second phase on a voluntary basis; just like the first phase, no compensation was provided. During the second phase, 24.49% of the participants (12 out of 1010 49 participants that constituted the 'first phase' set of users) send us their permission data. Note that numerous participants uninstalled our application after the first phase, thus we did not get responses from them. We gathered our findings regarding the 1015 alterations of permission settings during the second phase at Table 7 . Table 7 shows that the respondents during the second phase installed additional applications on their devices. The average number of installed ap-
1020
plications is approximately 80 per device. It was 74 at the first phase (rounded in both cases), if we take into account only these 12 devices. This is indeed a rough estimation, but it shows that participants installed additional applications on their phones in 1025 the one-month period between the two phases of our experiments. Hence, they were actually using their devices in this period.
The last row of Table 7 shows the percentage of installed applications having at least one altered 1030 permission setting, compared to the first phase settings. On average, we derive that (per device) only 2.26% of the installed applications presented altered permission settings. As a matter of fact, 50% of the respondents' devices did not present any changes at 1035 their permission settings. We must stress again that at the end of the first phase, all participants saw a tutorial underlining that Marshmallow users were able to change any permission, for any application, anytime they wanted using the Settings application.
1040
In total, 14 applications were found having altered permission settings in our dataset. Among them, user No 5 revoked access to the Contacts group for 1 application and user No 46 revoked access to the Camera for 1 application (presented in 1045 bold at Table 8 ). On the contrary, 14 applications presented altered permission settings providing access to the following dangerous groups: 5 applications were given access to the Storage group, 3 applications were allowed to access the Microphone 1050 and the Camera groups and 2 applications were able to access the Location and the Contacts groups. Details can be seen at Table 8 . Table 8 indicates that users at the second phase of our experiments were again more keen to allow access to the Stor- It would be ideal to repeat the experiments more than once in order to make conclusions that are 1060 more robust; hence, we could obtain more than one additional snapshot. A longitudinal study in this context would provide insightful details of users' actions. However, we believe that this strategy would discourage our volunteers to participate and they 1065 would be disengaged from the beginning of the experiments. Thus, we chose to proceed with the less pervasive approach of taking one additional permission snapshot from the participants' devices. Also, it would be interesting to have the ability to in-1070 terview participants who returned a second set of permission data in order to better understand why users adjusted their apps' privacy settings a month later or why they did not do that. However, received data were anonymous, hence we do not have 1075 this opportunity. We recognize that this is a limitation of our pilot study but future work will account for that.
As a conclusion, results presented in this section demonstrated that users' initial permission settings 1080 did not radically change in the second snapshot. Half of the users from the second snapshot did not change any permission settings for the installed applications. The other users just changed a small part of the initial settings. Also, the results show that our participants are more willing to provide access to their devices' storage, when an application initiates such a request. that this number is persistent. Despite that the ChatON service is no longer available 9 , this token can be used by third party applications (just like 'Permissions Snapshot' did) to identify a device, just by using the public PackageManager class.
ChatON Tokens
This forms an example of bad coding practice which should be avoided, because it introduces vulnerabilities related to privacy; these tokens might be used for the identification of a device.
Discussion
1115
Android mobile OS introduced a significant enhancement to its access control system with the advent of the Marshmallow version. Previous work [18] showed that users would prevent permission requests from applications if they had this abil-1120 ity. The former generation of the Android OS did not provide this opportunity to the users. Therefore, all permission requests from an application were accepted by default, if users agreed to install it on their devices. Our work, validates the results
1125
9 http://bit.ly/MMG2pP of [18] using data derived from actual devices running Android 6.0+. In addition, the results we presented in this paper (regarding permission groups' accessibility rates) were confirmed by another research work, which gathered data from a different 1130 group of participants [19] .
The current study shows that it is possible to gain information about users' permission settings utilizing publicly accessible classes such as the PackageManager class. This methodology al- model it is possible to create anonymous user profiles. These profiles could be used by online vendors to further personalize their digital application stores. In addition, personal privacy profiles can be used by artificial intelligence agents, which are em-1150 bedded in the most modern mobile operating systems, in order to optimize recommendations to individual users.
The results of our pilot study initiate a discussion about how effective the new model is in providing 1155 additional security to the user. We have seen that most applications request access to device's storage and the majority of users allow them to access it. However, we have noticed that, on average, 60% of the participants used fine-grained settings 1160 on their devices, which is a positive step towards security and privacy enhancement. On the other hand, data derived from a small set of 12 participants who submitted permission data for a second time, showed that only one permission was revoked 1165 on participants' No 5 and No 46 devices, respectively. This finding complements and validates recent work which examines the lack of continuance of secure behavior from users [20] .
Limitations
1170
Although we attracted a considerable number of participants for this pilot study, we did not make extensive use of all collected data. This happened because we did not get detailed information about how often an application is used on the specific de-1175 vice, or if it was actually launched at least once be-fore data collection occured. Therefore, we included at the second part of our analysis only participants who had used fine-grained settings for their applications, excluding others that might continuously prevent applications to access sensitive resources. Thus, we could not reliably identify if there exist users that consistently deny access to specific applications. However, in future work we will account for this problem, engaging respondents to provide 1185 usage statistics. This will be achieved by recruiting participants from crowd sourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk or Microworkers. The current work can be considered as a pilot study on real users' devices that initiates a discussion about 1190 how Android users adjusted to the fine-grained access control paradigm.
Additionally, although we distributed 'Permissions Snapshot' via Google Play, our study was conducted during a period when the majority of An-1195 droid users owned devices that were running older versions of the OS. Therefore, the participants of this study were mainly males and probably most of them were tech savvy individuals, owning Google Nexus smartphones and tablets. Unsurprisingly, 1200 our sample included users having super user privileges on their devices. However, we also received data from participants with different profiles (e.g. older people or users with limited number of installed applications), hence the behavioral patterns 1205 demonstrated in this paper should not be linked with specific groups of people.
Moreover, we should acknowledge the fact that when it comes to questions related to privacy enhancement, most of the users would probably agree 1210 that they prefer more privacy. Thus, the reader should take into account that users often lean towards utility than privacy [12] and should be careful when making extrapolations from the results. Further work in the future will include a larger and 1215 more diverse sample of users, given that the runtime permission model is currently utilized in 3 Android versions (Marshmallow, Nougat, Oreo). We also plan to assess users' privacy and security profiles using frameworks like [21] . 
Related Work
Previous work highlighted privacy-and securityrelated concerns associated with Android's installtime application permission system, such as the proliferation of over-privileged applications [22] . In 1225 a recent study, Pearce et al. [23] showed that approximately 49% of the Android applications at the Android Market were over-privileged because of the use of advertising libraries. Moreover, the authors indicate that such pervasive over-privileging consti-1230 tutes a threat to users' privacy.
Prior work that studies user-defined privacy and security controls on mobile devices showed that users (on average) have to make over a hundred permission decisions per device [7] . In addition, 1235 researchers demonstrated than users are often unaware of the number (or the context) of permissions they granted to applications at the past [24] . Jeon et al. [25] proposed a framework to address security issues that arise from the (old) coarse-grained 1240 permission model. They used a taxonomy of four main Android permissions groups and developed a fine-grained permission model to increase the security of existing apps without affecting functionality and without requiring platform modifications.
1245
A recent paper by Wijesekera et al. [18] showed that during a study, at least 80% of the participants indicated that they would prevent at least one permission request of their experimental application if they were aware of its purpose and functional-1250 ity. The participants also stated that they would block over a third of permission requests if they had this choice. However, other studies highlighted that most of the users do not pay attention to system messages related to permission requests [26] . Addi-1255 tionally, researchers demonstrated that users were often surprised by the ability of applications to collect personal data in the background and share data with third parties [27] . Advertising libraries for example have been consistently examined for data ex-1260 posure and leakages; a recent study revealed a trend in advertising networks to become more aggressive in collecting reachable user data [28] .
In the previous years, a number of security extension mechanisms have been proposed to over-1265 come privacy constrains of the previous permission model [29] . Some approaches add access control processes to provide the user the ability to choose permissions and reduce run-time constrains for each application [30] . Other methodologies introduce 1270 fine-grained access controls for Android applications aiming to enforce control over the assignment of permissions through explicit policies [31] . Moreover, FlaskDroid [29] extended the latter framework to provide a flexible, fine-grained access control 1275 mechanism for diverse security policies. Furthermore, TaintDroid [32] was designed to track tainted data from essential sources on Android and detect unauthorized data leakage.
In order to protect mobile devices from unlim-ited data sharing, several systems have been proposed. Some approaches focus on location services [33] , offering its users the ability to adjust location accuracy when using location-based applications. At the same time, on-device or service-based obfuscation techniques have been advised as a methodology to maintain users' privacy [34] . Such schemes according to [35] , that utilize abstract location descriptions, may cause location sharing to increase. Beresford et al. [36] presented their system, 1290 named MockDroid, which essentially feeds 'empty' resources or 'fake' information to apps that require access to sensitive data [25] . Another data protection mechanism that relies on obfuscation is AppFence [37] ; this system substitutes shadow data in place of data that the user wants to keep private. In addition, there exist methods based on crowdsourcing, which aim to utilize contributors' protection decisions in order to provide application specific privacy recommendations for iOS devices [38] .
1300
Fine-grained permissions were indeed first introduced earlier on another platform (iOS 6). However, our current work assesses for the first time security settings of users based on data derived from their own devices, which were not modified for the 1305 needs of this study. In this work we assume that participants do not share their devices with other people and we intent to highlight behavioral patterns related with their perceptions of security. In this paper we presented preliminary results based 1310 on a small set of users. However, we believe that the approach we used in tandem with an improved version of the survey app, which collects more contextual information (following principles presented in other research works [3] ), is promising and will 1315 assist us to identify privacy preferences of Android users.
Conclusions
To conclude, in this paper we discussed the results of our pilot study that investigates Android 1320 users' security and privacy settings and preferences under the run-time permission model. The responses from our participants indicate that these users maintain a positive view about this change. Most of them claimed they prefer the new system 1325 and they believe that now they can control easily the sensitive data they share. We also demonstrated that, in general, one third of the requested permissions in our sample belonged to dangerous permission groups. Additionally, we showed that 1330 Storage, Contacts, Location, Phone and Camera were the most requested dangerous permissions groups from the installed applications in the participants' devices. Furthermore, considering the accessibility of particular applications to resources, we 1335 highlighted the persistence of users to allow access to groups that are directly related to their main functionality (e.g. Camera for Instagram or Contacts for LinkedIn). Moreover, we showed that (in general) users' behavior is consistent regarding the 1340 resources they allow to social media applications to access. However, additional research work needs to be done to assess users' trust to specific applications. Finally, after collecting permission data from the same sample of participants after a pe-1345 riod of one month, we found out that 50% of the respondents had not changed any permission settings on their devices. This might occured either because they did not request additional functionality from the apps, or because they did not use the 1350 apps during the one month period. Furthermore, only 2.26% of the installed applications (on average) presented different permission settings. Hence, we conclude that although Android (starting from version 6.0+) provides the ability to its users to con-1355 trol more efficiently resources used by applications, our participants did not utilize this functionality widely. In the future we wil address the limitations of this pilot study by capturing usage data to stress the context within the users' decisions are made. 
